Reflecting Nature by Strandenæs, Emilie
Reflect ing Nature  	  
Emilie M. Ø. Strandenæs 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
Thesis presented for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Supervised by Professor Carsten M. Hansen 
IFIKK, Faculty of Humanities 
University of Oslo 
December 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your head will collapse 
But there’s nothing in it  
And you’ll ask yourself 
 
Where is my mind? 
Where is my mind?  
Where is my mind? 
 
The Pixies, Where is My Mind (1988)  
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Abstract  	  
By what kind of mechanisms do we perceive the physical world beyond 
ourselves? What is the relation between perceptual processes and 
natural evolution? What is the nature of a perceptual state? In this thesis 
I discuss traditional inference theories of perception. These views have 
suggested that perceptual processes resemble rational processes of 
inference or computation. I compare traditional inferentialism with 
Bayesian perceptual science. In The Origins of Objectivity (2010) Tyler 
Burge argues that perceptual science makes non-trivial use of 
representational notions. Perceptual states constitutively represent a 
physical world beyond the individual. I present this view in light of the 
previous discussion. Finally, I explore whether the perspectival feature of 
perceptual representation suggests that they are subjective experiences.  
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Introduct ion 
 
In what sense does perception reflect a specific environment? By what 
mechanism do our perceptual systems manage to account for the 
environments that surround us?  
 
In the first chapter of this thesis I present representationalism about 
perception — The view that perceptual states, like beliefs, desires and 
thoughts, have conditions for accuracy.  
 
In chapter two expand on inferentialism in perceptual psychology. 
Traditionally, this paradigm has been associated with the idea that 
perceptual systems perform sub-personal operations resembling rational 
processes. I present Bayesian approaches to perception, which model 
perception processes as probabilistic computation. I argue that the 
Bayesian approaches are neutral on the nature of actual perceptual 
processes.  
 
In The Origins of Objectivity (2010) Tyler Burge argues that sub-personal 
perceptual processes mirror physical principles because interaction 
between individual and environment has shaped the processes. 
Perceptual systems have developed through a process of natural 
evolution. The mechanisms that govern perceptual formation reflect the 
nature they have evolved within, but they do not represent it in 
computational or inferential processes. In chapter three I present and 
discuss this view.  
 
While perceptual processes themselves do not represent environmental 
information, perceptual states are objective representations of the 
physical world according to Burge (Burge 2010:1). He argues that 
	   	  
	  
ix 
perceptual science presupposes that perceptual states can be accurate 
about physical entities. Physical entities figure constitutively in the type 
individuation of perceptual states in perceptual psychology. The success 
of perceptual science suggests that representational perceptual states are 
real entities. Perception marks the beginning of representational mind 
(Burge 2010:xi). 
 
In chapter four I discuss the connection between mental representation 
and conscious experience. I suggest that the notion of an unconscious 
mental representation is problematic. How can a perceptual state 
constitute the perspective of a subject, if not as an experience? Mental 
representations constitute a mode of representation, or way of referring. I 
present a view of such modes of presentation as constitutively subjective 
in a way that only experiences are.   
Ch. 1   Percept ion 
 
A central paradigm within contemporary philosophy and psychology of 
perception is that perceptual states can be, and generally are, accurate 
about entities and subject matter within the physical world. Most 
notably, representationalism is contrasted to direct realist views. Broadly 
construed, the latter views suggest that entities and subject matter are 
not represented in a perceptual state. Rather, the entities and subject 
matter are parts of the state in question. I make use of central notions 
from Tyler Burge’s (2010) account of representationalism in this 
section. Representationalism about perception is the view that 
perceptual states are intentional states. Intentionality is the minds 
directedness upon subject matter. Certain mental states seem to be 
directed upon subject matter, in the sense that they are about that 
subject matter. Beliefs, desires, thoughts — these are about certain 
subject matters. There is a significant contemporary tradition of 
explaining intentionality in terms of representation. According to this line 
of thought, a mental state is about certain subject matter, if it can be 
true about that subject matter. Representationalism about perception is 
the view that perceptual states represent in this manner. ‘Truth’ is a 
predicate generally applied to propositional contents. Perceptual states are 
generally not taken to have propositional contents. Veridical1 perceptual 
states are accurate (Burge 2010:39). Perceptual states have perceptual 
contents with accuracy conditions, according to representationalism. 
Veridical perceptual states accurately indicate the environment to 
individuals (Burge 2010:39). Mental representation, intentionality and 
representation are used interchangeably in this thesis, unless something 
else is indicated.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘All kinds of being ‘true’, ‘correct’, ‘accurate’ etc. are sub-cases of veridicality.’ (Burge 2010:39) 
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1.1 Objectivity 
In his major work The Origins of Objectivity (2010) Tyler Burge argues 
that representationalism is assumed by perceptual psychology. The 
science as it is today relies on the assumption that perceptual states are 
representational. Representational vocabulary not only figures in 
perceptual science — it plays a non-trivial role in psychological 
explanation (Burge 2010:292). Perceptual science provides extensive 
reason to think that perceptual states are mental representations. In fact, it 
suggests that mental representation begins in perception — 
phylogenetically and for the individual (Burge 2010:xi). Intentionality 
marks the mental. Perception is the beginning of the mind (Burge 
2010:xii). 
 
Objectivity is a notion that figures centrally in Burge’s account of 
representationalism. As mentioned, intentionality is the minds 
directedness upon subject matter. Intentionality begins in perception in the 
sense that it is the ‘most elementary type of representation’ (Burge 
2010:xi) namely, ‘accurate — objective — representation of the physical 
world’ (Burge 2010:xi). Perceptual states are directed upon subject 
matter in a special sense: They are directed upon the physical world and 
they are (generally) accurate about that world. This way of being 
directed upon the world is the sense in which perceptual states 
objectively represent. Two main features are associated with objectivity: 
Representation of physical reality, and accuracy (Burge 2010:46). 
Perception just is the individual’s capacity to ‘(…) represent the world 
objectively’ (Burge 2010:1).  
 
‘The objectivity of such representation lies (…) in it’s accuracy and it’s specifying 
attributes relevant attributes in a way that entail their physicality. It also lies in the 
physical subject matter’s being (…) constitutively non-perspectival'. (Burge 2010:59)  
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Objectivity is intended to capture the phenomenon that individuals have 
mental states about physical reality beyond themselves. These states are 
generally accurate. Perception generally informs perceives about how 
things really are with that physical reality. Perceptual states manage to 
reveal something beyond that perceivers’ idiosyncratic ‘point of view.’ As 
perceptual states are representational, they will always be perspectival. 
Representational states have modes of representing — they have 
representational content (Burge 2010:37). Representational contents ‘(…) 
constitute, or help constitute, modes in which an individual thinks 
about, intends or perceives a subject matter.’ (Burge 2010:38) Hence, 
perceptual states have ways or modes in which subject matter is 
represented. The individual perceives reality beyond herself from a 
perspective, or point of view. However, perceptual states are about 
subject matter that is ‘(…) constitutively non-perspectival.’ (Burge 
2010:59) Hence, in perception, an individual has awareness of an 
objective, non-perspectival subject matter, from her subjective, perspectival 
point of view.  
 
Understanding how individuals can have representational states about 
an external physical reality is a major philosophical problem.2 In what 
sense are our minds about physical reality? How can our subjective 
perspectival mental states come to be accurate about the world beyond 
ourselves? Burge argues that veridical representation of physical reality 
begins in perception (Burge 2010:23). Hence our sense perception 
underlies other kinds of mental representation of an external world. A 
central problem associated with perception as objective representation is 
the underdetermination of sensation. The problem expresses an idea 
that has been prevalent within philosophy. How does the information 
we register in our sensory organs result in accurate physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ’(…) how to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view 
of that same worlds, the person and his viewpoint included?’ (Nagel 1986:3) 
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representation? How is perception objective representation of 
something beyond our sensory organs?  
 
1.2  The Problem of Underdetermination 
Understanding the relation between sensation and perceptual constancy is 
one of the key themes in modern perceptual psychology. I expand on 
perceptual constancy in chapters two and three. For now, I think it is 
sufficient to say that objectivity is what perceptual constancy provides to 
perceivers. Burge argues that ‘The primary problem for the psychology of 
visual perception’ (Burge 2010:89) is in fact to explain how visual 
perceptual states that objectively represent the physical environment 
‘are formed from the immediate effects of proximal stimulation (…)’ 
(Burge 2010:89). The proximal stimulation that our sensory organs 
register underdetermines their environmental causes. Hence, sensation 
does not in it self reveal how perception can be objective representation 
of a non-perspectival physical reality. Proximal sensory registration does 
not in it self appear to determinately reveal a non-perspectival physical 
reality.  
 
1.3  Underdetermination in Vision 
To explain the problem of underdetermination in modern perceptual 
psychology, I will look to the explanation of the problem in Wade & 
Swanston (1991).  
 
All sensory systems function by transuding some type of environmental energy into a 
form that can be analysed by the cells in the central nervous system (Wade and 
Swanston 1991:59).  
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When we sense, nerve cells in sensory organs are influenced by 
environmental energy3. These cells stimulate other cells until signals 
finally reach the CNS (Central Nervous System). Nerve cells, or 
neurons, influence one another by transmitting electro-chemical signals. 
Cells transmit signals that influence other cells across synapses. In vision, 
the retina is where environmental energy is registered by neurons. On 
the retina, there are receptors that contain light-sensitive pigments. The 
retina is an outgrowth of the CNS. When light bounces off 
environmental entities and hits the eye, the light rays are ‘concentrated’ 
by the lens and the cornea. Light is transmitted through the pupil, and 
reaches the retina. It casts an inverted image of the environmental scene 
that it was reflected from. The image cast on the retina is a 2D 
representation of a 3D environmental scene.  
 
The environmental cause of visual stimulus is underdetermined. A 2D 
image of a 3D scene does not carry information about how it should be 
interpreted as representing a 3D scene. Many different environmental 
scenes could have caused the 2D image that is cast on the retina. The 
nature of retinal sensory registration entails that the distal 
environmental cause of proximal visual stimulus is underdetermined. 
Hence, the 2D visual stimulation that underlies visual perception is not 
alone sufficient for visual perception.  
 
In our external environment, the strength and location of light rays shift. 
Shades move over surfaces that we perceive, sunrays become weaker as 
clouds pass over the sky. Variances in lighting conditions and motion 
influence retinal images. When I view a bicycle in motion, the size of the 
retinal image cast by the bicycle will change. When I walk toward my 
friend, the image he casts will be larger as I approach. Visual stimulus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The following account is, as mentioned, based on the explanation of visual underdetermination in 
Wade & Swanston (1991:55-65). 
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drastically varies. Yet, constant physical properties are revealed in vision. 
I perceive my friend as remaining constant in size even though there is 
relative motion between us. It seems to me that a field of oats remains 
constant in colour although a windy day makes cloud-shaped shades 
move rapidly over the field.  
 
Some psychologists and philosophers have maintained the view that 
perceivers must somehow internally interpret sensory data in order to have 
determinate perception. Perceivers must entertain some capacity to take 
sensory information to be about a specific environmental cause. A 
dominant tradition within this paradigm is inferentialism. Views of this 
kind suggest that perceivers, or perceptual systems, must somehow make 
inference, from sensory information and some additional information, to 
perceptual representation. In the following chapter I discuss two central 
examples of inferentialist theories.  
 
Irvin Rock is a key figure in the development of modern inference 
theory, and I present and discuss his notion of perceptual inference. I go 
on to present Bayesian perceptual science. This approach models 
perceptual processes as probabilistic computations. While Bayesian 
perceptual science resembles inference theory, it does not suggest that 
actual perceptual systems perform these computations. Hence, the 
Bayesian approach is as inferentialist approach only in so far as it models 
perception as computation. It differs from traditional inferentialism 
because it is silent on the nature of actual perceptual processes.  
 
The science I present reveals how perceptual processes must in some 
sense reflect principles that govern the environments of actual 
perceivers. Principles of physical reality are somehow evident in 
perceptual processes. While Rock argues that these principles are 
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represented within perceptual systems, Bayesian models are silent on just 
how actual perceptual processes mirror natural environments. 
 
In 2010, Burge argues that, while environmental principles are reflected 
in perceptual processes:  
 
(...) there is no sense in which the principles are “accessible” to the perceiver or the 
perceiver’s perceptual system. (Burge 2010:96) 
 
Hence, Burge’s view rejects the idea that actual perceptual systems 
make inference or perform computation. I contrast Burge’s view with 
inferentialism in chapter three. Assuming that perceptual systems take 
sensory information to mean something, is ‘(...) almost as bad as 
thinking of the planetary system as applying principles governing its 
motion.’ (Burge 2010:96)  
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Ch.  2  Perceptua l  Psychology   
 
I order to introduce inferentialist theories I will expand on perceptual 
constancy. I will rely on Rock’s own description of size constancy, as I 
think his account presents a good vantage point for the general 
discussion of inferentialism.  
 
2.1  Size Constancy  
In the chapter on size constancy from his book Introduction to Perception 
Irvin Rock addresses two problems regarding size perception (Rock 
1975:27). One problem concerns how the size of objects appears 
constant to us, even as entities move closer and further away from us. 
Why do objects not appear to decrease and increase in size as they 
move? Images cast on the retina through the ocular lens do. This 
question addresses just how things can appear4 to have constant size. 
The other question Rock addresses concerns the relation between visual 
stimuli and the perceived size of objects: Why do things appear to have 
the specific sizes that they do? The two questions relate to the same 
phenomenon: Thing appear to have stable and specific size. This 
phenomenon is size constancy.  
 
Both of the questions Rock addresses make methodological use of the 
problem of underdetermination. Rock presents a version of the problem 
by giving a description of vision in terms of optics and a description of 
the eye. The size of a retinal image is inversely proportional to the 
distance of an object: Not only is the size of the retinal image 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Rock makes no terminological distinction between ’appearance’ and ’perception’. Hence, he seems 
to assume that perception is perceptual experience.  
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proportional to the size of the object that reflects light onto the ocular 
lens: But as the ocular lens projects an inverted image of the physical 
scene onto the retina, the size of the inverted image will be proportional 
to the angles with which light hits it.  
 
The following illustrations are taken from (1975:28-30) Rock explains 
how size constancy is affected by distance. The distance between the eye 
of the viewer and the object viewed, influences the size of the image on 
the viewer's retina. (Rock 1975:28) The eye contains a lens. A lens 
brings rays of light to focus. It bends incoming rays of light, in such a 
way that the light that is transmitted from — or reflected from — a 
point in space, if allowed through the pupillary opening of the eye, will 
be focused on a point in the eye. Hence, points in space have 
corresponding points on the retina. Light from point A in space will 
create retinal image-point a. 
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Imagine that points A and B, as illustrated in the figures are the top and 
bottom of a physical object. The further apart these two points are, i.e., 
the larger the object is, the larger the retinal image the object casts will 
be. This point is simply an environmental fact. A larger distance between 
A and B causes a larger distance between a and b. This is because the 
direction of the light-rays determines the direction in which the ocular 
lens will deflect them, as seen in the illustrations below (Rock 1975:29). 
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Should the object A-B be moved further away from the ocular lens, the 
difference in the direction of light-rays from point A and B would be 
smaller. Hence, light rays from these points would deflect closer 
together — points a and b would be closer (Rock 1975:30). Hence, 
distance affects the size of retinal image. As Rock’s puts it: 
 
(…) the size of the retinal image (or visual angle) is inversely proportional to the 
distance of the object. The term visual angle is used synonymously with size of retinal 
image (…) Fig. 2-6. (Rock 1975:30) 
 
 
 
 
These illustrations reveal how the angle between points of registration 
on the retina increases proportionally to the angle between the points in 
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space that emit the light registered. The angle between points that 
emanate light that is registered on the retina decreases relatively to the 
viewer as the points move further from the ocular lens. 
 
Rock’s examples show that the size of a retinal image is simply a 
function of the size and distance of an object looked upon. However, 
the perceived size of objects appears not to be a result of the same 
function as the size of retinal images (Rock 1975:31).  
 
Rock points out how the appearance of size in perception can be 
deceitful. In a sense, objects do appear smaller at a distance (Rock 
1975:32). However they do not appear proportionally smaller to the 
increased distance between viewer and entity viewed. Things perceived 
at a distance don’t look as much smaller as the retinal image decreases 
with distance. The size of retinal images varies more radically than the 
environment appears to us to do (Rock 1975:31).  
 
The illustrations above reveal that visual angle is ambiguous regarding 
the size of objects. Hence, in order to have determinate perception of 
the size of objects, the distance between perceiver and object must 
somehow influence the relevant perceptual process.  
 
Rock’s account of size constancy shows that certain physical facts are 
somehow reflected in perceptual processes: Size constancy somehow 
reflects how distance affects the angles of light-rays that enter the 
pupillary opening.  
 
So far, the account I have given of Rock’s explanation of size constancy 
does not presuppose that perceptual processes are inferences. However, 
Rock explicitly claims that distance is ‘taken into account’ in size 
constancy (Rock 1975:33). Size is evaluated by the perceptual system 
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(Rock 1975:75). Hence, the relevant physical facts (physical facts that 
explain how distance affects retinal image size), are reflected in the 
perceptual system in the sense that they are represented in it. 
  
2.2  Reflecting as Inferring  
In the article ‘In Defence of Unconscious Inference’ (1975b), Rock 
makes explicitly what he means by unconscious inference.  
 
By unconscious inference I mean that the process of arriving at the percept is one much 
like reasoning in which conclusions are drawn from premises, except that in perception 
the outcome is a percept rather than a conclusion. (Rock 1975b: 258) 
 
He suggests that facts from optics and physics (facts regarding the way 
distance affects retinal image size) are stored in the perceptual system as 
premises. These premises figure in perceptual processes that resemble 
the process of reasoning. Principles that determine how sensory stimulus 
and physical facts will yield objective representations are not merely 
describable for the perceptual system on this view. Rather, the 
perceptual system makes use of principles of reasoning. Size constancy is 
(something like) a judgment, starting from environmental stimulus 
(retinal image) and environmental principles (facts of optics and physics) 
and ending at stable perceptual representation. Rock commits to the 
view that actual perceptual systems make inferences.  
 
The problems involved with the notion of unconscious inference have 
been subject to extensive philosophical discussion5. In ‘Perception as 
Unconscious Inference’ Gary Hatfield discusses three central and 
intuitive problems associated with such a notion: The Cognitive 
Machinery problem expresses the concern that theories of unconscious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Ludwig (1996) and Burge (2010:92-93) 
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inference must ‘account for the cognitive resources needed to carry them 
out’. Hatfield questions whether unconscious inferences are supposed to 
be inferences made by the cognitive faculty of an individual, or whether 
the perceptual system itself is supposed to entertain the capacity to 
perform inference (Hatfield 2002:120). The Sophisticated Content 
Problem questions how the perceptual system or perceivers in general 
are supposed to entertain premises regarding their environments. For 
example, if size constancy requires that perceptual systems or perceivers 
somehow entertain premises regarding how distance affects retinal image 
size (note that this information plays an essential role in Rock’s 
explanation of size constancy), how can such premises be entertained by 
visual systems or perceivers? It is not the case that individuals need to 
understand the principles that govern size constancy in order to perceive 
entities as having specific, determinate sizes. If size constancy is a matter 
of inference, must the visual system understand these principles? 
(Hatfield 2002:120)6 The Phenomenal Experience Problem questions how 
the conclusion of an inference can be anything like a perceptual 
experience. How can premises containing environmental information 
about distance and size result in a conclusion that is visual experience of 
objects? (Hatfield 2002:120) These problems are just examples of the 
kind of issues facing theories of unconscious inference.  
 
Rock’s theory has explanatory value that is independent of the notion of 
unconscious inference. His account of size perception reveals that 
distance will somehow be reflected in size constancy. Even if one denies 
that the perceptual system evaluates distance, it is explanatorily 
interesting that size constancy somehow relates to distance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Both of these problems essentially illustrate Burge’s arguments against Compensatory Individual 
Representationalism: They illustrate how certain theories require inappropriate capacities of 
perceiving individuals (Burge 2010: 13-22, ch. 4-7). 
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I turn to Bayesian perceptual science. As mentioned, this approach does 
model perception as an unconscious probabilistic computation. 
However, the Bayesian approach does not commit to the view that 
actual perceptual systems perform such computations.   
 
2.3  Bayesian Approaches 
Bayesian perceptual science describes how perceptual systems reflect 
environmental principles, by creating probabilistic, mathematical 
models. Bayesian approaches model perceptual processes in the 
following way: The perceptual system entertains a hypothetical space of 
possible environmental scenes. It selects the most likely scene based on 
input in order to overcome the problem of underdetermination. Hence 
Bayesian perceptual psychology rests on the idea that certain hypotheses 
about the relation between a proximal stimulus and an environmental 
cause have a higher likelihood than others. Bayesian statistics are based 
on Bayes theorem. The following example can illustrate the theorem, 
applied to a case where posterior statistical data informs a prior 
likelihood. 
 
A team of scientists are mapping the occurrence of a rare, dangerous 
disease in a population. They want to establish the frequency of affected 
individuals within the population. Estimates suggest that 2‰ of the 
population are afflicted. (a) represents the frequency of cases within the 
general population. In order to map the disease, the scientists conduct 
genetic screenings of all known patients. They discover that 60% of 
patients have a specific genome. The relevant genome has been given 
much previous attention and is well mapped: Approximately 1% of 
individuals within the general population have the genome. (b) 
represents the value of the distribution of the genome in the general 
population. With the present data the scientists can use Bayes’ theorem 
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in order to calculate the likelihood of individual being afflicted (Pa) if 
they have the genome (Pb). They can express how the prior likelihood 
of any individual being afflicted (a) is informed by additional relevant 
statistical data, namely the data they have regarding the relation 
between the disease and the genome (Pb|a) and the data they have 
regarding the general distribution of the genome (b). 
    
Bayes’ theorem is as follows: 
 
 
 
We know the value of (a), (b) and (Pb|a).  
 
 
 
The happy team of scientists can publish a break through article 
establishing that people with the relevant genome have a 12 % chance of 
being afflicted by the disease, and receive funding for further research.  
 
Bayesian decision theory is based on Bayesian statistics. This is a useful as 
a tool for modelling cases where several hypotheses are underdetermined 
by data. As mentioned, Bayes theorem provides a tool for calculating 
how a prior likelihood will be informed by additional relevant data. 
Hence, Bayesian decision theory can be used to model cases where the 
likelihood of a given hypothesis is informed by additional testing. The 
example above illustrates this. Bayesian decision theory effectively 
models how a given hypothesis has a higher likelihood of being the 
solution to an underdetermination problem considered in light of some 
additional relevant data.  
 
 (Pa⎜b) = (0.6)(0.002) = 0.12 
          0.01 
(Pa⎜b) = (Pb⎜a)(Pa)  
          Pb 	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Bayesian decision theory is apt for describing mathematical models of 
perceptual processes. The models can be used to describe how 
perceptual systems overcome the problem of underdetermination by 
reflecting the statistical properties of the environments they have 
developed in. I will present a simplified and generalized example to 
illustrate this point. It is a statistical fact about our natural 
environments that sources of light are generally placed above us. Hence, 
one can describe a model of a perceptual system where different possible 
locations of light sources are represented as hypotheses about the 
environment in the perceptual system. Each hypothesis will have an 
equal prior probability. Interaction between perceivers and the 
environment will influence the probability each of the hypotheses. As 
light generally does come from above, this hypothesis will be increasingly 
probable as perceivers and environments interact. Hence, Bayesian 
models can incorporate how interaction with an environment will make 
specific hypotheses about that environment more probable. They model 
the perceptual system as probabilistic inference. Specific entities and 
subject matter will be represented in perception if they are the content 
of the ‘hypothesis’ that is the most likely. On this simplified picture, the 
environmental hypothesis with the highest likelihood will be the one 
that is recurrently confirmed by the actual environment. The models can 
incorporate how interaction with an environment makes specific 
hypotheses about that environment more plausible.  
 
Bayesian approaches to perception do not presuppose that the 
interaction between a specific individual and her environment informs 
the likelihood of environmental hypotheses. Many of these models 
suggest that interaction between species and environments over time is 
reflected in perceptual processes. Such models presuppose that actual 
perceptual processes reflect that perceptual systems have been selected 
for (Geisler & Diehl 2003:379).  
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Actual perceptual processes will mirror what has been beneficial to 
perceive under which environmental circumstances for individuals’ 
ancestors. This is evident considering the use of ideal observers. An ideal 
observer is a Bayesian probabilistic computation that represents an ideal 
solution to a perceptual task (Geisler & Diehl 2003:385-387; Geisler 
2011:771-772). An ideal solution to a perceptual task is modelled in 
light of meta-data regarding the utility of predicting a given 
environmental cause under certain environmental conditions. Ideal 
observers incorporate utility: They recognize which perceptual outcome 
is useful under what environmental conditions. 
 
As mentioned ideal observers illustrate a central feature of Bayesian 
approaches, namely that they attempt to capture how perceptual 
systems developed by a process of natural evolution. Ideal observers rely 
on the idea that actual perceptual systems will reflect utility: Actual 
perceptual processes will be determined by evolution. Hence individuals 
with perceptual systems that indicate the environment in such a way that 
the interests of those individuals are well preserved will be selected for. 
Ideal observers not only specify the likelihood of an environmental cause 
given a stimulus, they predict the likelihood of a given perceptual 
prediction, given the probability of an environmental cause, and a meta-
consideration of the utility of predicting in such a way under given 
environmental conditions (in the presence of given physical 
entities/states of affairs). An ideal observer can be a good model for 
describing perceptual phenomena where properties or entities that do 
not exist in the environment are repeatedly indicated to individuals. An 
example, of such misperception might be how rabbits frequently 
misperceive predators in cases where no actual predator prevails. 
Rabbits frequently thump their feet in order to communicate to other 
rabbits that danger is approaching, when they hear loud noise or observe 
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rapid, unexpected movements. Perhaps this illustrates that the gain of 
being alert is larger than the cost of misperceiving in certain cases. Ideal 
observers can account for such phenomena.  
 
Modelling the process from sensory input to output as a probabilistic 
inference allows statistical analyses of the utility of specific outcomes 
under specific environmental conditions. This is illustrated by the values 
that must be specified for a description of an ideal observer.  
 
There are four values that are specified in an ideal observer: (1) A 
perceptual task; (2) the prior probability of a category (an 
environmental state); (3) the likelihood of any possible stimulus given 
each of the possible categories (each possible environmental state); (4) a 
utility function (the costs/benefits associated with predicting a given 
state) (Geisler & Diehl 2003:380). 
 
Initially, ideal observers were specified for simple models of perceptual 
tasks: They were typically set to solve tasks of accurately predicting 
between two alternative candidate environmental states. For such a task, 
specifying the utility function is simple: There is an equal cost involved 
with any erroneous prediction. An example of such a task might be to 
accurately detect a spot of light against a white noise background. This 
task involves selecting between two possible alternatives at a given time 
(spot or no spot) (Geisler & Diehl 2003:380). Describing an ideal 
observer for this task involves describing the prior likelihood of every 
possible state of the environment (the likelihood of there being a light 
spot at time t1; at time t2; etc.); The likelihood of every possible 
stimulus being caused by every possible state of the environment (light 
intensity l1 caused by light spot at time t1; etc) and a value for the 
utility function (the cost/benefit of reaction r (the formation of a given 
state) if there is a light spot at t1, etc). Perceptual systems have 
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developed through natural selection, so descriptions of the process of 
perceptual prediction must reflect what behaviour is beneficial for an 
organism under which environmental conditions: It must reflect that 
individuals who make beneficial predictions are selected for (Geisler & 
Diehl 2003:379).  
 
Natural tasks are vastly more complicated than the simple tasks that 
were initially described in ideal observers. Natural tasks are not simply 
about maximizing the accuracy of prediction: In describing ideal 
observers for complex natural tasks, this has to be incorporated (Geisler 
& Diehl 2003:381). Understanding how actual populations of species 
have developed informs how the scientist think about the value of the 
utility function for ideal observers: Investigating what actual conditions 
correlate with the development of which perceptual capacities provide 
insight into when it has been useful for individuals to react in which way 
to a stimulation (Geisler & Diehl 2003:381).  
 
For many advanced computations of solutions to advanced natural tasks, 
Bayesian inferences that specify the utility function as maximizing fitness 
have provided results that largely correspond to actual organism’s 
predictions. Maximal fitness observers are ideal observers where the 
utility function represents statistical data regarding what reactions have 
actually proven beneficial for organisms under what environmental 
conditions (Geisler & Diehl 2003:381). This suggests that actual 
perceptual systems do reflect the utility of certain reactions, given 
certain environmental causes. Indeed, a maximal fitness observer that is 
set to solve a task of detecting contours based on information equivalent 
to sufficient visual stimulatio, yields predictions that are nearly 
equivalent to what humans do on the basis of visual stimulation (Geisler 
& Diehl 2003:396). The upshot of this is that human vision appears to 
illustrate that there are cases in which accurate perception is beneficial. 
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Some human visual perception is accurate because accurate vision has 
been beneficial for survival. I address this idea in relation to Burge’s 
picture of teleology and accuracy in section 3.6.  
 
2.4  Probabilistic Perception   
Bayesian approaches assume that the perceptual system must somehow 
be ‘tuned in’ on an environment. Just as distance must be reflected, or 
play some role in size constancy, the likelihood of environmental scenes 
given stimuli, and the utility of indicating certain entities in specific 
situations, must be reflected in perceptual processes, according to 
Bayesian models.   
 
How does the system reflect likelihood and utility? There are two ways 
to interpret Bayesian perceptual science: Perceptual systems can operate 
on non-computational mechanisms that can be modelled as probabilistic 
inferences, or they can represent the probabilities and compute on them. 
As mentioned, there is no reason to think that Bayesian approaches are 
committed to anything stronger than the former view.  
 
The first interpretation involves understanding perceptual process as 
some kind of transitional process from stimulus to state that can be 
described as values in a Bayesian function. Actual perceptual systems do 
not compute, on this view: However, perceptual processes are 
computable. Both the probability of environmental cause given state and 
utility would be reflected in perceptual processes, in the sense that one 
cold observe that these factors when studying perceptual processes. One 
can describe computational models for the weather or social economic 
structures: These phenomenon do not perform computations. In the 
same way, perceptual systems do not perform computations even though 
they can be computed on, on this view. The fact that Bayesian decision 
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theory is used to describe perceptual processes does not suggest that 
perceptual systems make decisions: Only that they must overcome an 
underdetermination problem.  
 
One can interpret perceptual systems as representing probabilities and 
performing computations. The system would normatively follow laws 
that can be described as values in a Bayesian function. It would literally 
perform computations on the basis of these functions. On this 
interpretation, the system would represent statistical facts about the 
environment and the relation between the environment and stimulation, 
in order to calculate the probability of an environmental cause, based on 
stimulation. Independently of the exact process of formation, on this 
understanding of the perceptual system, it would not only be 
mathematically useful to describe the formation of perceptual states as 
an inferential operation: Rather, this would describe the actual process 
of formation.  
 
Bayesian decision theory is used in any number of sciences. Social 
medicine, social studies and natural science make use of Bayesian 
statistics and Bayesian decision theory. The fact processes can be 
modelled using probabilistic decision theory does not in it self suggest 
that the process involves any decision-making.  
 
Explicit statements from psychologists working with Bayesian models 
vindicate the first interpretation of the relation between Bayesian 
computations and actual perceptual systems: 
 
‘(…) the terms in the formulas of the Bayesian framework can represent any 
psychological/biological system that can be characterized by an input and an output.’ 
(Geisler & Diehl 2003:399) 
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This quote essentially reveals that psychologists working within the 
Bayesian framework do not commit to the view that perceptual 
processes are computations. Only in so far as there are reasons for taking 
any ‘biological system that can be characterized by an input and output‘ 
to perform computations, are there reasons for assuming that actual 
perceptual systems do. Bayesian approaches to perception are in them 
selves neutral on the inferential nature of actual perceptual systems. The 
models themselves do not suggest that perceptual systems are 
computational.  
 
2.5  Inference and Representationalism 
Rock’s notion of perception as unconscious inference commits him to 
representationalism about perception. Suggesting that perceptual states 
are the conclusions of processes of reasoning over premises, entails that 
perceptual states have representational content. They follow as 
consequences from represented premises and rules. Hence the states must 
be representational states. Any view suggesting that actual perceptual 
processes are inferences or computations with perceptual states as their 
conclusions or outcomes simply claims that perceptual processes are 
representational processes with representational outcomes.  
 
As I have argued, Bayesian models do not address whether actual 
perceptual processes are computational. Hence, they are not obviously 
committed to representationalism for the same reasons as other inference 
theories. However, there is reason to think that the theories do assume 
representationalism.  
 
Bayesian approaches individuate perceptual states by describing them as 
representations of specific environmental entities. They describe 
perceptual states as states that can be accurate about particular objects 
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or properties in the environment:  
 
However, as a concrete example, consider a task where there are just two categories of 
object and the observer’s (authors remark: the ideal ‘observer’s’, i.e. the computational 
model’s) task is to be as accurate as possible in identifying which object was presented.’ 
(Geisler 2011:772, italics mine)  
 
In general, it is true that much of human perception is veridical under natural 
conditions. (Geisler & Diehl 2003:397, italics mine) 
 
While Bayesian models do not assume that actual perceptual systems 
perform computations, they do individuate perceptual states as 
representational contents with accuracy conditions. They assume that the 
outcomes of perceptual processes are perceptual states about physical 
entities. Perceptual states are assumed to have representational content 
in the models. The solutions to perceptual tasks are contents about 
specific physical entities7.  
 
This does not entail that the use of such representational notions reveals 
that actual perceptual processes have representational outcomes. 
Modelling perceptual states as probabilistic inference relies on specifying 
perceptual tasks that have representational contents as their solution. A 
perceptual state analysed as the outcome of a computation will naturally 
be a representational content in that model. In this sense, the theories 
might be analysed as neutral on whether perceptual states genuinely 
have representational contents.  
 
A central question is how a non-inferential, non-computational process 
can result in perceptual representations. In (2010) Burge explicitly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This point is recognized by Michael Rescorla in ’Bayesian Perceptual Psychology’ (2013:14):  
‘Bayesian models individuate both explananda and explanantia in representational terms.’  
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argues that no pre-perceptual representation is required for objective 
veridical representation. Hence he argues that representationalism is 
true, without supposing that perceptual systems represent conditions for 
representing. Perceptual processes involve no representation of conditions 
for objective representation of the physical world (Burge 2010:19). 
Representation of conditions for objective representation is precisely 
what Rock requires from perceptual systems. Perceptual systems, 
according to Rock, have to represent environmental facts in order to 
make inference from sensory data to perceptual state. Evidently, Burge’s 
reasons for thinking that perceptual states are representational are not 
the kind of reason I described in relation to traditional inference theory.  
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Ch.  3  Orig ins  of  Object iv i ty  
 
Perceptual processes somehow reflect principles that govern the 
environments around us. They mirror statistical principles that are 
prevalent in the physical world. This is required for perceptual 
constancy. In (2010) Burge argues that perceptual processes do not 
represent these principles. How do the systems reflect them?  
 
As evident from Bayesian perceptual science, evolution shapes 
perceptual processes. Somehow, natural evolution plays a significant role 
in determining the mechanisms of perception. What is the relation 
between accuracy and evolution? Burge argues that perceptual states 
objectively represent. They are generally accurate about the physical 
world. In what sense are processes shaped by natural evolution aimed at 
accuracy?  
 
In order to explain Burge’s view I present his accounts of lightness 
constancy and planar slant/planar surface texture. These examples reveal 
that perceptual processes mirror statistical regularities in the 
environment.  In light of these I discuss the teleological element of his 
picture.   
 
3.1  Reflecting Regularities 
Lightness Constancy 
Lightness constancy is the capacity to visually perceive a surface as the 
having the same lightness (the same colour) even as differences in the 
illumination of the surface provide an organism with drastically varying 
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proximal stimulation (Burge 2010:351). Many organisms are generally 
capable of perceiving achromatic surfaces as having an even colour under 
varying conditions of illumination. A surface seems uniformly white, 
even if parts of the surface are shaded. This means that organisms are 
capable of keeping track of the surface reflectance of an entity. 
 
The intensity of light that a surface reflects is given by a combination of 
the reflectance properties of the surface material and the intensity of 
light that is directed at the surface (the illumination of the surface). This 
is a fact about the physical environment. A surface reflects some 
intensity of light. The intensity of the light varies as the illumination of 
the surface varies. The receptors that register light intensity cannot in 
themselves determine whether lightness intensity variations are due to 
variations in surface reflectance or in luminance (Burge 2010:352). This 
provides a clear example of how proximal stimulus alone does not 
privilege one representational perceptual state over another. It illustrates 
underdetermination. 
 
There is nothing about the light intensity registered by the receptors in 
the eye alone that should indicate that a white surface with shades 
appears the same shade of white all over, rather than appearing 
patterned in different shades of white and grey. Visual psychology 
provides experiments to the effect that the capacity to make such a 
distinction is not a higher cognitive capacity. Many primitive animals are 
able to distinguish surface reflectance from surface illumination. They 
have the capacity of perceiving lightness constancy. This indicates that 
in determining lightness constancy the perceptual system must draw the 
distinction between what is a property of a distal object and what is an 
environmental condition that, in effect, distorts visual stimulation from 
the object (Burge 2010:352). 
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Appealing to, amongst other, vision scientist Steven Palmer, Burge 
claims that the receptors that register the intensity of light reflected 
from a surface immediately form what are called luminance contours, on 
the basis of discontinuities in the light intensity registered by adjacent 
receptors in the eye (Burge 2010:352). Luminance contours are 
functional registrations of discontinuities in light intensity. If two 
neighbouring receptors register sufficiently different intensities of light, 
corresponding to there being some sudden difference of light-intensity in 
the perceived environment (as there is if one observes a white surface 
with dark patches) the receptors register a luminance contour. The 
registration of luminance contours indicates that there is some sort of 
discontinuity of lightness intensity in the distal environment: The 
luminance contours that the receptors register correspond to some kind 
of environmental discontinuity.  
 
If a series of spatially adjacent receptors (…) produce a pattern of registrations of 
sharply different, adjacent levels of light intensity, (the) receptors produce a luminance 
contour. (Burge 2010:352) 
 
Lightness contours are direct, non-perceptual encodings of proximal 
stimulations. The formation of lightness contours alone still 
underdetermines the distal cause of the contours. There is nothing 
about the contours themselves that indicate whether they are caused by 
discontinuities in surface reflectance or discontinuities in luminance. If 
the visual system is to overcome this problem, something must 
determine that a visual perceptual state is an appropriate reaction to a 
given luminance contour.  
 
On Burge’s account, law-like regularities between states of the 
perceptual system (Burge 2010:346) do this work. In lightness 
constancy the perceptual system operates on semi-automatic transitions 
from stimulus to luminance contours to states indicating edges. These 
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three steps reflect three stages in the process of objective perceptual 
representation. The step from sensory input; to registration; to 
perceptual indication, or representation. 
 
‘Law-like regularities in the perceptual system (…) reflect (…) law-like 
regularities in the distal environment.’ (Burge 2010:346)  Perceptual 
processes have developed so form perceptual constancies in accordance 
with statistical regularities in the environment. This reveals a deep 
similarity between Burge’s account and Bayesian models:  
 
Perceptual systems have developed so that their representational states tend to correlate 
with the likely causal antecedent, in the systems’ formative environment, of the given 
proximal stimulation. There is a many-one mapping from distal environmental cause, 
to the proximal stimulus, and a one-many mapping from proximal stimulus to the 
environment. But there is something like a one-one mapping from proximal stimulus 
to distal environmental cause that is most likely to have generated that proximal 
stimulus. (…) Nature molds all sensory-systems — perceptual and non-perceptual — 
to be likely to respond to conditions that are beneficial to animals’ function. (Burge 
2010:345)  
 
In effect, Burge argues that perceptual systems have developed so as to 
indicate the most likely environmental cause of a proximal stimulus. 
However, the system must reflect evolution: It must somehow mirror 
that natural selections mold systems in a manner such that they are 
beneficial for the individual’s conditions. I address this further in 3.6.   
 
A statistical fact about nature is that sharp discontinuities in the 
intensity of light reflected by a surface are usually due to discontinuities 
in surface reflectance, while gradual discontinuities are due to 
discontinuities in illumination. Registrations of sharp luminance 
contours will generally result in states indicating a discontinuity in 
surface reflectance, while gradual luminance contours will generally 
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result in states indicating a discontinuity in illumination. The 
registration of a certain luminance contour will result in the formation 
of a determinate state in a specific case. Hence lightness constancy 
reflects statistical facts about the natural environment. There is a higher 
likelihood that a sharp discontinuity in lightness intensity is caused by a 
surface reflectance discontinuity. Registration of sharp lightness 
discontinuity generally causes perception of surface property 
discontinuity. Hence lightness constancy reveals how the perceptual 
system operates on mechanisms that actually reflect statistical facts 
about natural environments — it illustrates how the perceptual system 
is generally capable of forming accurate states.   
 
According to Burge, the process of forming a state given a luminance 
contour does not rest on a computation of the probable cause of the 
contour: Rather, a given contour will yield a determinate state for every 
case of registration and formation. Formation laws reflect facts about the 
environment. They are examples of ‘(…) environmental patterns that 
that have been encoded by the patterns of psychological transformations 
(…)’ (Burge 2010:346, italics mine). Precisely how environmental 
patterns are encoded without being represented is not obvious: 
However, Burge presents a number of considerations regarding how we 
should not think of the formation principles: The laws are computable, 
but they are not computations. The perceptual system does not 
computationally infer on the basis of statistical facts about the 
environment. Rather, the facts are reflected in law-like patterns of 
formation. They are not represented in the system (Burge 2010:346). 
Law-like patterns of formation can be described for the perceptual 
system. But principles of formation are not accessed by the system (Burge 
2010:346). 
 
	   	  
	  
31 
Another example Burge provides in order to explain how the perceptual 
system reflects statistical facts about the environment is his account of 
planar slant/planar surface texture. 
 
Planar Slant from Planar Surface Texture 
A sheet directly in front of, and at an angle perpendicular to the visual 
field of an observer, with a pattern of evenly distributed circles of the 
same shape and size will appear upright to the observer. If the sheet is 
slanted backwards, the top circles in the pattern will create retinal 
images of circles that are increasingly elliptical. The angle will also affect 
the size of the projected image of the pattern (Burge 2010:359).  
 
The slanted sheet will appear to have the same pattern as it did when it 
was perpendicular to the observer: Some part of the perceptual system 
reflects environmental facts about the projection of images when forming 
perceptual states indicating slant (Burge 2010:359). 
 
A sheet that is directly in front of and perpendicular to an observer, with 
a systematically uneven distribution of non-uniform ellipses will appear 
to be slanted. Determining the slant of a surface rests to a large extent 
on registering facts about the texture of the surface. If a surface has some 
pattern, the structure of this pattern will affect the appearance of slant. 
Statistical environmental facts (which patterns are more likely to come 
about in nature, and how certain patterns will reflect light and thereby 
project images on the retina when slanted) is reflected in the perceptual 
systems indication of slant. In nature there is a statistical likelihood in 
favour of an object having a surface texture that creates a pattern of 
evenly distributed objects of roughly the same size, over it having a 
surface texture creating a pattern of a systematically uneven array of 
non-uniform shapes. So there is a statistical likelihood that images on 
the retina corresponding to descriptions of the latter kind are images 
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produced by slanted surfaces. The perceptual system automatically 
represents as of a slanted surface (statistically appropriate cause) rather 
than upright surface with unusual pattern (statistically inappropriate 
cause). The perceptual system mirrors natural elegance and order: 
Textures that create homogenous patterns are statistically more 
common. The system reflects this principle.  
 
Burge’s accounts of lightness constancy and planar slant/planar surface 
texture accord well with Bayesian models. They illustrate how the 
perceptual system reflects statistical facts about the environment. 
However, as the system has been shaped by evolution it reflects utility. 
Perceptual processes indicate as of likely causes of proximal stimulus. 
However, they do this only in so far as it is ‘(…) beneficial to animal 
function’ (Burge 2010:345).  
 
The statistical regularities the system reflects are not accessible to the 
perceptual system (Burge 2010:97, 346). They are not applied in any 
implicit (or explicit) operation of reasoning within the perceptual system 
(Burge 2010:97). Law-like transitions within the perceptual system can 
be described mathematically in the same way that any law governing any 
process can. They are computable, in the sense that they can be given a 
computational account (Burge 2010:94-95). But they are not 
themselves computations actually occurring within the perceptual 
system. 
 
Burge’s account suggests that perceptual science does not rely on 
analysing perceptual processes as computations or inference. The way he 
presents lightness constancy and planar slant, perceptual constancy does 
not rely on a computational theory of the perceptual system. There is no 
determinate evidence in favour of the view that perceptual processes 
represent information about the environment and performs probabilistic 
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computations on it. Bayesian approaches illustrate this very point. They 
do not commit to any specific interpretation of the nature of actual 
perceptual processes.  
 
Objective representation of the physical world is the primary kind of 
representation. Hence, it is evident that perceptual processes cannot be 
inferential or computational, according to Burge. He expands on this 
idea when he presents a family of view’s that have required inappropriate 
representational capacities from individuals. 
 
3.2  Individual Representationalism 
Theories assuming that objective representation of the physical world 
depends on representation of conditions such representation exhibit 
what Burge labels Compensatory Individual Representationalism (CIR) 
(Burge 2010:111) These view’s fail to acknowledge that objective 
representation of physical subject matter does not depend on prior 
representation. Examples of inappropriate conditions for objective 
representation are the acquisition of certain language skills; or the ability 
to distinguish reality from mere appearance; or self-consciousness (Burge 
2010:19). Individuals would not represent subject matter beyond their 
idiosyncratic perspectives, without such primary representational capacities, 
according to certain CIR-views. Inferentialism as Rock presents it, 
illustrates this: According to his view, perceptual systems must represent 
information about the physical environment. They would have to 
represent conditions, or rules of interpretation, in order to represent the 
physical world. Hence, perception would not be the initial kind of 
representation there is. CIR-views have generally placed inappropriate 
restrictions on which individuals should be thought of as perceivers. 
Some theories exclude creatures without conceptual thought and 
language. Some exclude all non-human creatures as well as human 
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infants. Burge argues that it is empirically proven that all mammals, and 
certain non-mammalian creatures have perception (Burge 2010:102). 
There is empirical evidence suggesting that creatures do not need 
language, concepts or self-consciousness in order to have objective 
representational states.  
 
3.3  The Principles of Anti-Individualism 
Anti-individualism figures in Burge’s rejection of CIR-theories. It is a 
view about the constitutive conditions for an individual to be in 
perceptual states (Burge 2010:61). Some CIR-views are anti-
individualistic. However, anti-individualism plays a fundamental role in 
establishing an alternative conception of objective representation of the 
physical world as the primary kind of representation.  
 
Anti-individualism has consequences for what perceptual states are. It 
represents a philosophical approach to perception: It is a theoretical 
standpoint regarding the nature of perceptual processes. Burge’s aim is 
to show that perceptual psychology, which does investigate actual 
perceptual processes, must assume this philosophical stance. Anti-
individualism about perception is, according to Burge, not merely 
compatible with perceptual psychology: It is a working hypothesis of the 
psychologists (Burge 2010:98). Anti-individualism has two central 
features: It suggests that perceptual processes reflect environmental 
principles. It alto supposes that perceptual states have representational 
content.  
 
Principles (A) and (A’) present a general formulation of anti-
individualism.  
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(A) The natures of many mental states constitutively depend on relations between a 
subject matter beyond the individual and the individual that has the mental states, 
where relevant relations help determine specific natures of those states. (Burge 2010:61) 
 
(A’) The natures of mental states that empirically represent the physical environment 
depend constitutively on relations between specific aspects of the environment and the 
individual, including causal relations, which are not in themselves representational; the 
relevant environment–individual relations help determine specific natures of the states. 
(Burge 2010:61) 
 
Mental states that empirically represent the environment are any kind of 
mental state that is about the physical world. (A’) claims that 
individuals’ non-representational relations to their environments 
determine specific natures of such states. Even higher cognitive states 
that rely on perceptual representation again rely on non-representational 
relations between individual and world. After all, these non-
representational relations are necessary for perception. Processes that 
are not representational account for the processes that cause objective 
representation. This is why perception is the beginning of 
representation. Causal relations between the individual and her 
environment account for objectivity. No additional representation for 
conditions of objectification is required. As mentioned, as and as evident 
from (A’) causal relations determine perceptual contents.  
 
According to Burge, perceptual systems reflect environmental facts 
because they have developed while creatures have interacted with their 
environments (Burge 2010:70, 320,326). Objectivity relies on 
individuals’ causal interaction with specific environments. Regularities, 
principles within those environments are mirrored in perceptual 
processes.  
 
Burge explains how causal interaction determines objective 
representation by appealing to a notion of whole animal function. 
Perceptual systems have developed so as to facilitate agency for 
individuals. Individuals generally need to relate to the actual 
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environment in order to fulfil whole animal functions. (Burge 2010:320) 
Whole animal function is something like the organism’s self-sustainment 
and fulfilment. It is the organism’s striving to survive and reproduce. In 
order to fulfil whole animal function, individuals must fulfil biological 
needs such as eating, navigating and mating (Burge 2010:320). Aspects 
of the real environment of an individual – how things really are in that 
environment will naturally have an effect on how individuals can fulfil 
their biological needs. Hence, as individuals interact, non-perceptually, 
with the environment in order to eat, navigate and reproduce, their 
‘agency’ will be influenced by that environment. The environment will:  
 
(…) figure in (…) individual’s responses to the environment in fulfilling basic needs 
and activities. (Burge 2010:321) 
 
As perceptual systems develop in accordance with animals fulfilling basic 
biological needs, aspects of the environment that play significant roles in 
the fulfilment of these needs will be reflected in perceptual systems. 
Perceptual systems function to facilitate whole animal function. Hence, 
their processes reflect the actual environment in which animals have 
eaten, navigated and mated. Actual environmental entities figure in 
perceptual states, in this way. They determine the processes that cause 
the states. This is evident in Burge’s accounts of lightness constancy and 
planar slant/planar surface texture. Regularities in the perceptual system 
reflect regularities in the environment. 
 
3.4  Representation 
The idea that perception has developed within a specific environment 
does not in it self suggest that perceptual states have representational 
content. It merely suggests that real entities, with biological relevance 
will affect the structure of perceptual processes. Burge argues that 
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scientific explanation of these processes makes non-trivial appeal to 
representational contents (Burge 2010:292). Perceptual science assumes 
that its’ explanada are states with veridicality conditions. The science 
appeals to representational content as a ‘real kind’ (Burge 2010:293).  
 
Perceptual science makes non-trivial appeal to representational content 
in the sense that these explanations could not have been replaced by 
non-representational notions (Burge 2010:293). Hence the central 
argument in favour of representationalism is a kind of non-reductivism. 
The notion of a representational function figures in this argument. It 
reveals how Burge describes perception as a teleological process.  
 
 
3.5  Teleology 
A principle that is closely related to anti-individualism illustrates the 
notion of a representational function. This principle does not follow 
from anti-individualism (Burge 2010:68), but it is closely related.  
 
(B) For an individual to have any representational state (such as a belief or perception) 
as of a subject matter, that state must be associated with some veridical representational 
states that bear referential, indicational, and attributional representational relations to a 
suitably related subject matter. (Burge 2010: 68) 
 
Burge claims that all representational states constitutively depend on 
veridical representation. Perception functions to represent. 
Understanding what a functional capacity is, relies on understanding 
‘successful realization’ (Burge 2010: 68) of that functional capacity. The 
idea is that representational states are the states they are in virtue of 
standing in some relation to states that have fulfilled their function. 
Understanding what perception is relies on understanding instances 
upon which the perceptual system performs the task it functions to, 
namely to veridically represent.  
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Hearts, hammers and ovens are ‘functional systems’. These entities have 
specific tasks they function to perform. Understanding a heart, or a 
hammer, or an oven requires understanding what these things function to 
do. Indeed, being a heart, hammer or oven, seems to presuppose that 
the heart, hammer or oven can, sometime has, or is appropriately related to 
something that has, performed their appropriate function. Being a heart 
requires that the entity in question is either in relation to other hearts 
(in the sense of being the result of a developmental process) or that it is 
constructed in order to perform the functions of a heart (take artificial 
hearts — artificial hearts are also appropriately related to things that 
actually have performed the appropriate tasks that hearts perform.)  
 
Representational function is ‘constitutively associated with 
representational success’ (Burge 2010:309). Representational contents 
are the contents that they are in virtue of their accuracy conditions: In 
virtue of what they aim at representing. We individuate representational 
contents in virtue of what they aim to represent. For example, sentence 
‘George is happy’ means (represents) what it does in virtue of its 
conditions for being true. The sentence functions to represent that 
content.  
 
Principle B claims that perceptual contents are the contents they are in 
virtue of being ‘related to veridical states that bear (…) representational 
relations to a suitably related subject matter‘ (Burge 2010:68). Hence 
perceptual states are the representations they are, they have the content 
they do, in virtue of being related to subject matter. Their 
representational functions depend on their relations to the things they 
aim to represent: They have their content in virtue of relations to those 
things.  
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As perceptual states are type individuated through their content, they 
have representational functions. Only representations have such 
representational functions. Non-psychological, biological systems (such 
as the immune system) do not aim at accuracy (Burge 2010:300-301). 
Biological systems have functions. However, they do not function to be 
accurate. They aim at success, at ‘functioning well enough for to 
contribute to survival and reproduction’ (Burge 2010:303). No non-
mental system aims at accuracy. That is why representational contents 
are not obviously reducible to non-representational phenomena. Non-
representational phenomena cannot capture the teleological aspect of 
representations. They cannot capture the specific teleology that only 
representations have.  
 
Notable theories of intentionality have attempted to explain 
representation in terms of some notion of biological function. 
Teleological theories of mental content generally attempt to reduce 
mental representation to other kinds of functional capacity (Burge 
2010:299). Notably, such theories8 aim at explaining the 
representational properties of mental states in terms of biological 
function. A simplified explanation of such a theory might suggest that 
what it means for a mental state to be about a cat is that it was selected 
for in order to be about that cat. On this very simplified explanation, 
function is supposed to explain representation. According to Burge, 
teleological theories aim to explain what objective representation is in 
terms of some notion of ‘(…) co-variation or causal co-variation, or 
structurally isomorphic causal co-variation’ along with ‘biological 
function’ (Burge 2010:194). Hence these theories aim to reduce 
representational notions used in psychology to causal correlation 
between a representation and the things it represents. Psychological 
explanations would not rely on a notion of veridicality according to such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Neander (2012) for a good introduction to teleological theories.   
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a view: Veridicality, accuracy, representation can be explained in terms 
of other, not exclusively psychological, notions. A representational 
state’s being accurate about some subject matter can be assimilated to 
how a heart can succeed to fulfil it’s biological function. Being true is just 
being selected for correlation, on this view. Burge’s account does not aim 
to reduce representation.   
 
Perceptual systems do have biological function, according to Burge. The 
way I read Burge, the reason it that the function of a representation is to 
be veridical. Hence, explaining what the function of a representation is 
relies on understating successful realization (Burge 2010:68). 
Representational states do not merely aim at correlation, according to 
Burge. They aim at accuracy. Hence, understanding the specific function 
that a representation has relies on some notion of veridicality. A 
representational content constitutively relies veridical representation 
(Burge 2010:68). Perceptual processes have been selected for so as to 
cause states that function to be accurate about some subject matter. Not 
merely to correlate with that subject matter. This specific functional 
aspect that only representational states have, cannot be explained in 
terms of function and correlation alone.  
 
Reflecting on the notion of a function, there is a sense in which this 
point is quite intuitive. How could a functional capacity be reduced to 
something else? Can the specific function of a hammer, a heart or an oven 
be wholly explained in terms of anything else? I think there is an intuitive 
notion of a function where no function can wholly explained in terms of 
something else. However, there is a sense in which a hearts, or a 
hammers or an ovens function can be reduced: We can describe what a 
specific hammer, or a heart or an oven does when it is executing its 
function in non-functional terms. We can give explanations in terms of 
for example physics – explanations that make no appeal to the specific 
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function of a hammer, or heart or oven in order to explain what a specific 
hammer or heart or oven is doing in each instance of its performing its 
function. The way I read Burge it is this kind of reductive explanation 
that cannot be given for a representational content. If the function of a 
representational state is to aim to be about something, it is not obvious 
that it’s what it does when it executes that function can be described 
without making use of some kind of notion of veridicality. Explaining 
what a representational state is doing depends on describing that specific 
representational function — namely aiming for accuracy. The specific 
way that a representational content functions to be accurate cannot be 
captured without making use of some notion of veridicality, according 
to Burge. Hence he argues in favour of non-reductivism about 
representation.     
 
3.6  Evolution 
Where does the representational function of perceptual states come 
from? If biological systems aim at ‘contribution to fitness’ (Burge 
2010:303) alone, what makes a perceptual system aim at accuracy? After 
all, these systems have evolved. Why would systems aimed at accurate 
representation evolve from non-representational structures? Why would 
the law-like processes that govern perceptual formation reflect actual 
environmental statistical regularities? Couldn’t perception simply be 
wholly interest-dependent? Natural selection has shaped the perceptual 
system, as evident from how these systems reflect nature. Why would 
this selection aim at accuracy?  
 
Evolution does no care about veridicality. It does not select for veridicality per se. Being 
fitted to successful evolution is a matter of functioning well enough to contribute to 
survival and reproduction. Well enough often coincides with veridicality. (Burge 
2010:3030)    
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The quote expresses what maximal fitness observers (Geisler & Diehl 
2003:396) reveal9. Accurate perception is beneficial for survival. 
Evolution itself in no way recognizes veridicality. However, individuals 
with accurate perception will in general be well equipped to sustain 
whole animal function. Navigating, eating and mating rely on interacting 
with environmental entities. Successfully navigating, mating and eating is 
in general facilitated by accurate indication of actual environmental 
entities. As mentioned, interactions between individuals an 
environment, individuals’ striving to fulfil whole animal function, are the 
causal relations that determine perceptual representation. In this sense, 
Burge’s account does appear to entail that perception is ‘wholly interest 
dependent’. However, interest and accuracy will generally co-vary. 
Hence, the fact that perception is aimed at contributing to successful 
behaviour suggests that it is aimed at objectivity.  
 
The notions perceptual state and perceptual system are partly teleological notions. 
(Burge 2010:309) 
 
Perceptual systems are teleological because they function to represent. 
Like any functional part of natural systems, they have been selected for, 
in order to fulfil that function. It is useful for an organism to have a 
perceptual system that generally fulfils its function, just as it is useful for 
an organism to have a heart that generally fulfils it’s natural function.  
 
As certain phenomena (such as rabbits’ ‘thumping') reveal, veridicality 
and utility do not always coincide. However, reflecting on what agency 
is, simply suggests that it generally will.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See p. 26. for discussion of maximal fitness observers.   
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Action is prior to perception (Burge 2010:326). Not all kinds of action 
depend on intellectual capacities, such as desire, intention or will. 
Organism’s striving toward fulfilling whole animal function involves a 
kind of agency. This kind of agency has determined the shape of 
perceptual processes. These processes determine which specific physical 
particulars; entities and subject matter are represented in perception. 
This is how perception is anti-individualistic. The agencies of our 
ancestors determine what we perceive.  
 
Burge’s account of perception as selected for a specific kind of teleology 
(its aim at accuracy) presents a way of giving answer to the traditional 
subjectivity/objectivity problem I mentioned in chapter one. How do 
perceivers, from their subjective perspectives, perceive the real world? The 
answer is that evolution has selected for systems that generally do. These 
systems have developed so as to reveal how things really are. The 
processes that govern perceptual formation are molded by nature to 
reflect reality. Hence, perceptual states represent a mind-independent 
world. Biological needs have determined the shape of perceptual 
processes. A capacity to relate to how things really are beyond an 
individual will generally promote her ability to fulfil such needs.  
 
 
3.7  Perception as Experience  
Mental representation is a phenomenon that philosophers have aimed at 
reducing to non-representational phenomena. This reflects the general 
desire in philosophy to reduce mental phenomena to non-mental 
phenomena, in order to understand how the mind fits into the natural 
order of things. Burge’s project presents a non-reductive way of 
‘naturalizing’ representation. He claims to have found mental 
representation in natural science. Hence, he gives a non-reductive 
explanation of intentionality which accords with natural science. 
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Intentionality begins in perception (Burge 2010:10, 3-108). It is shaped 
by the nature around us.  
 
Representational states are perspectival. They contain a certain mode of 
representation, or way of referring. According to Burge’s picture, 
perceptual representation does not constitutively rely on consciousness 
(Burge 2010: 368, 374). Perceptual states can be (and sometimes are) 
unconscious perspectives on this view. Such states unconsciously represent 
the world to subjects in specific modes, or ways of referring. The idea 
that perceptual processes and have developed so as to sustain whole 
animal function plays an important role in Burge’s explanation of how 
perceptual perspectives are not necessarily experiences. In the following 
chapter I discuss a view of mental representation according to which 
Burge’s view overlooks a part of the nature of mental representation.  
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Ch.  4  Exper ience  and Intent ional i ty
  	  
This chapter is a discussion of the relation between consciousness and mental 
representation — in perception and in general. I explore a strong thesis of 
phenomenal intentionality. According to this view, only conscious 
experiences are mental representations. I assume that we have unconscious 
mental lives. What I wish to explore is a view upon which this unconscious 
mental life contains no representational content with veridicality conditions. 
According to the view I present, neither consciousness nor mental 
representation is the mark of the mental. Some non-representational and 
non-experiential property must delineate the beginning of mind.  
 
I do not make in-depth discussion about what this property should be. I 
think that a promising suggestion for what such a property could be, is a kind 
of intentionality, or representation, that does not rely on veridicality-
conditions (i.e. that does not rely on way of referring or mode of reference). I 
briefly discuss this in 4.7. 
 
As mentioned, in this thesis I have simply assumed that intentional states 
have representational content (that they have conditions for being accurate). 
I will continue to do so in this chapter. Hence, the strong thesis of 
phenomenal intentionality is only meant to address sates with accuracy 
conditions.  
 
According to the strong phenomenal intentionality I explore, only experiences 
manifest this kind of representation. Hence, I explore a view of intentional 
states as conscious. It does not entail that all experiences are mental 
representations. Only that all mental representations are experiences.  
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I do not argue in favour of this strong view of phenomenal intentionality. 
Rather, I explore it as a coherent thesis. I present my primary motivation for 
being attracted to it: Namely that the view might capture how mental 
representations are perspectives in a sense that opposing views do not. Mental 
representations are perspectival, in the sense that they are specific modes of 
representation: They are specific ways of referring (Burge 2010:37). I suggest 
that all mental representations are perspectives in the sense that they are 
subjective experiences. I suggest that what makes a mental representation an 
individual’s perspective is not merely that it has representational properties. 
Rather, it constitutes an individual’s perspective in virtue of being her 
subjective outlook in a way that only experiences are. It manifests itself in an 
individual’s psychology as an experience. According to the view I present 
being subjectively manifest in this way is a necessary condition for being a 
mental representation. It is not the case that states become perspectives 
because they have perspectival representational content. Rather, they have 
perspectival representational content in virtue of being the perspective of an 
individual. Being the perspective of an individual is, I suggest, a sufficient (but 
not necessary) condition for being an experience. 
 
Reflecting on the notion of a mode of representation, or way of representing is 
the central ambition of this chapter. Smoke represents fire. Leaves represent 
autumn. However, only mental states with representational contents 
represent subject matter in a specific way, from a point of view. The strong 
phenomenal intentionality view is first and foremost a view about the nature 
of veridicality. It simply is the view that only experiences represent from a 
point of view. Hence only experiences can have specific conditions for being 
veridical or accurate10.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The content of a sentence has truth-conditions. What I take for granted is that the content of a 
sentence is mind-dependent — Only when understood by a conscious perceiver does a sentence mean 
anything. Hence the content of a sentence, when understood, exists within the psychology of an 
individual as a mental representation. In this sense, only mental states have conditions for accuracy. 
There is no third realm where contents exist. Any content is part of someone’s psychology.  The strong 
phenomenal intentionality can be understood independently of this point. I does not hinge on the 
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In (2010) Tyler Burge explains a way of thinking where perceptual states are 
the perspectives of individuals (i.e. are mental representations that should be 
attributed to the individual’s psychology), not in virtue of being experiences 
(Burge 2010:376). Experience does not account for how representational 
states ’belong to’ or ‘represent for’ the individual. Rather, the relation 
between agency and perceptual processes (i.e. how perceptual states have 
developed in order to sustain whole animal function), and the nature of what 
it is to be a perspective explains why we should attribute perceptual states to 
an individual, and not merely to her perceptual system. Since perceptual 
states are perspectival states of the individual not in virtue of being 
experiences, this account is compatible with the view that there can be 
unconscious perspectival states of the individual. Burge argues that there is reason 
to think that there are unconscious perceptual representations (Burge 
2010:375). 
 
While I agree with Burge that perspectival states belong to the individual not 
in virtue of being experiences, I suggest that the only way in which 
perspectival states belong to individuals is as their conscious perspectives. Hence, 
while the role perceptual representations play in explanations of agency and 
the causal-evolutionary background of perceptual processes explain why 
perceptual representations are the perspectives of individuals, I suggest that 
an explanation that makes appeal to these features alone is silent on what a 
perspective of an individual is. I suggest a way of thinking where being the 
perspective of an individual simply entails being an experience. Any 
perspective is an experience, on this view. While one can explain how 
perspectives come to belong to individuals without appealing to conscious 
experience, any such perspective is an experience according to strong 
phenomenal intentionality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
idea that all content is mental in this sense. In it self the view only entails that all mental 
representations are experiences.  
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The view relates to the discussions in the previous chapters of this thesis 
because it suggests that, while perceptual psychology makes use of intentional 
notions, the psychology has not discovered that there is any unconscious 
representation. Perceptual psychology has, the view suggests, only discovered 
that perceptual experiences are mental representations.  
 
The chapter is intended to present and explore the foundations for a view of 
the mind. The view I wish to explore is that representational mind cannot be 
separated from consciousness: Mental representation is always subjective, in a 
sense that only experiences are. It relates to contemporary theories of 
embodiment. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address 
such theories. 
 
I begin by further addressing what I take ‘experience’ to be. I go on to 
present first a weaker form of phenomenal intentionality than the one I wish 
to explore. Subsequently I explain the strong version.  
 
4.1  What is Experience?  
Experiences are not merely events that a subject undergoes in this context. 
An experience is something that has some character that is presented for, or 
to, the subject of the experience. An experience is constitutively subjective. It 
has subjective character: It is like something for the experiencing individual11. 
Experiences are transparent to the individual. They are, in a sense, directly 
present to her. This does not, I think, entail that an individual is required to 
attend to or be able to conceptualize about her experience. However, 
experience is constitutively subjective mental event, in the sense that it is 
continuously like something qualitatively, for the subject.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Nagel (1986)  
	   	  
	  
49 
 
Individuals have consciousness. They are conscious only when they 
experience. Hence, consciousness is first and foremost something that 
individuals have when they experience. 
 
A specific kind of subjectivity is what makes something conscious, on my 
view: Having a subjective experience just means being conscious. Subjective 
character12 can be thought about as what separates being awake from a 
dreamless sleep or whatever enters into the stream of consciousness. There is, on my 
view, no distinction between the subjective character of an experience and 
the phenomenal character of the experience. Something’s seeming blue (in a 
phenomenal sense) constitutively depends on it’s seeming blue to a subject. 
Only in someone’s experience does something seem blue. I see no reason to 
differentiate between ‘conscious event’, ‘experience’, ‘conscious experience’, 
‘phenomenally conscious event’ or ‘phenomenally conscious experience’. 
Phenomenal properties are properties of experiences. Subjective character 
and phenomenal character are identical. They are properties of experience. 
The notion of experience I am delineating does not recognize a difference 
between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness13.  
 
4.2  Phenomenal Intentionality  
Views that advocate phenomenal intentionality, suggest that all intentionality 
somehow relies on or derives from phenomenal properties. Without 
experience, there would be no intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality as a 
general thesis is given thorough explanation in Kriegel (2013). He suggest 
that the thesis is based on: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Kriegel (2005)  
13 See Block (2003:483) 
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(...) the idea that intentionality is injected into the world with the appearance of a certain 
kind of phenomenal character. It is when the relevant phenomenal character shows up that 
intentionality makes its first appearance on the scene. (...) once this phenomenal character 
appears (...) intentionality can be ‘passed around’ to things lacking this (or any) phenomenal 
character. But the source of all intentionality is the relevant phenomenal character. (Kriegel 
2013:3) 
 
While Kriegel does not presuppose that intentionality is representation when 
they provide this definition, I will continue to assume that it is. According to 
Kriegel theories that fall under the phenomenal intentionality research 
program propose that states get their intentional properties from some kind 
of phenomenal character. His explanation is silent on just what this 
phenomenal character is. The most general thesis of phenomenal 
intentionality simply suggests that all intentional states are intentional in 
virtue of standing in some appropriate relation to some conscious experience. 
 My ambition is to explore a stronger kind of phenomenal intentionality than 
captured by the quote. This stronger view entails that intentional properties 
appear in experience: Only within someone’s experience does proper 
intentionality exist.  
 
The view is connected to what Kriegel labels intrinsic subjectivity (Kriegel 
2013:11). Intrinsic subjectivity has been put forward as a property that 
separates phenomenal intentionality from other kinds of intentionality. 
 
The idea behind the notion of intrinsic subjectivity is that mental 
representations are intrinsically subjective only if they intrinsically represent to 
or for someone (Kriegel 20103:11). Representation can be framed as both a 
two- and three-place relation. Spots can represent measles; ‘4’ can represent 
4; a picture can represent a person. These are all ways of talking about 
representation as a two-place relation. However, spots can represent measles 
to the doctor; ‘4’ can represent 4 to a math-student; a picture can represent a 
person to an audience. These examples illustrate how representation is a 
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three-place relation. States with intrinsic subjectivity, instantiate a three-
place representational relation of this kind, in themselves. These states 
themselves are constitutively three-place relations. The representational 
states in question contain in them an element of being representations to, or 
for, an individual (Kriegel 2013:11). They states intrinsically represent for 
someone. They are not representational states that can be interpreted by 
someone in another state: The very representational state in question 
essentially contains within it that it represents to a subject. The suggestion 
that only phenomenally intentional states have intrinsic subjectivity is 
prevalent in theories of phenomenal intentionality. The idea is that only 
experiences intrinsically represent to an individual.   
 
The claim that only phenomenally intentional states have intrinsic 
subjectivity relies on the idea that experiences have subjectivity of special 
kind. This kind of subjectivity must be in place if a state is supposed to 
intrinsically represent to someone.  
 
The strong view of phenomenal intentionality relates to the thesis of intrinsic 
subjectivity in this way: It entails that all mental representation has intrinsic 
subjectivity of this kind. For anything to be a real mental representation, it 
cannot only represent a subject matter — that state itself must represent 
subject matter to a subject. Representing to a subject is, according to the view 
I describe, equivalent to being an experience. Only experiences, I suggest, are 
subjective in the appropriate sense. Whenever I make use of the term intrinsic 
subjectivity I assume that this is an experiential phenomenon.  
 
The reason why I am drawn to the idea that all mental representations are 
intrinsically subjective is that intrinsic subjectivity can capture what I think is 
an essential feature of a perspective. It captures how perspectives belong to 
subjects. Perspectival states are not only states that can be attributed to an 
individual. Arguably, any number of non-perspectival states can be. For 
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example, behavioural states such as walking or sitting down or drinking are 
states that are attributable to me. I do the walking, sitting or drinking. 
However, these states do not constitute my perspective. Perspectival states, 
such as a visual experience of a snowy field, or my thoughts about my future, 
appear to belong to me in some way that states of walking do not. So what 
makes something a perspective? 
 
My suggestion is that that all genuine perspectives manifest these two 
essential features: 1. They are representational contents. 2. They are 
subjective experiences. All perspectives instantiate these two features 
together, according to the view I am presenting — only perspectives 
instantiate the first one. A perspectival painting is not a perspective other 
than metaphorically so: However, someone’s visual experience of the painting 
is. A speech written from ‘the point of view’ of Molly Bloom is not a 
perspective other than metaphorically so. However, someone who reads 
Molly’s speech can have Molly’s metaphorical ‘perspective’ as their real 
perspective when they read it.  
 
4.3  Perspective as Representation 
Representational contents are perspectival. They constitute modes of 
presentation, ways of representing. This perspectival feature of representations is, 
I take it, what Burge means by mode of reference, or way of referring (Burge 
2010:37-38). I think Fregean senses capture this feature (Frege 1892:217-
218). Representational contents provide a specific kind of ‘outlook’ or ‘way 
in which’ something is represented. No accuracy conditional representation 
of anything is complete: There is no representational view from nowhere. 
Mental representations are constitutively perspectival. They present some 
subject matter in a specific way. Perceptual representations of physical 
reality, for example, represent entities from specific angles in specific sensory 
modes. Perhaps thought, belief and desire are modes of a similar kind to the 
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sensory modes. Sensory mode or cognitive mode does not wholly capture 
what a mode of presentation is for mental representation. Not only are visual 
representations different from auditive representations, not only are 
representational thoughts different from representational desires. Thoughts, 
desires, beliefs, perceptions: Such mental representations also refer to specific 
parts of subject matter in specific ways. They pick out specific ‘chunks’ of 
reality in determinate ‘fashions.’ 
 
Representational mental states are perspectival in the sense that they refer to, 
or represent subject matter in a specific way. Being a mode of presentation, or 
a way of referring is the first feature I suggested as a feature of all and only 
perspectives.  
 
The obvious question at hand is: What more is there? What more is there to 
perspective, than being a mode of representation? The idea I wish to express 
is essentially this: In order to be a mode of representation, something has to 
be a mode of representation to or for someone. A constitutive part of being a 
mode of representation is that it somehow belongs to a subject. A perspective 
is something that someone has. My idea is that the best way of capturing this, 
indeed, the only way that doesn’t loose or overlook something, is by 
suggesting that any mode of representation is subjective in the sense that is 
has a subjective character. This is why I suggest that all mental 
representations are intrinsically subjective: They are all perspectives. My 
suggestion is that perspectives are the perspectives of individuals in the sense 
that they are essentially their outlooks or points of view, and that these 
outlooks or points of view constitutively have some way of being for the 
subject of the perspective.  
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4.4  Manifestation and Subjective Character 
Strong phenomenal intentionality of the kind I explore is a view about 
constitutive conditions for modes of presentation. The key claim is that any 
mode of representation must manifest itself in an individual’s psychology as an 
experience. Modes of representation cannot exist in the psychology of the 
individual if not as an experience. They have to be ‘embodied’ as experiences. 
Experience is in a sense the structure that realizes representation. These 
considerations are opaque. However, I think they do reveal something about 
the very nature of a mode of presentation. Modes of presentation are angular. 
They provide specific, determinate ways of picking out subject matter. That 
states in the psychology pick out specific subject matter seems to me to 
somehow rely on that subject matter having some kind of internal qualitative 
way that it is, in the individual’s psychology.  
 
What is the subjective character of mental representation? In what manner 
do representations manifest or embody? For perception I think a plausible 
suggestion is sensory feel. By sensory feel, I mean the qualitative character 
that characterizes ordinary perceptual experience. I mean the kind of bodily 
sensation that is associated with hearing, seeing, touching etc. Sensation is 
prior to perception. Sensory information registration precedes perceptual 
representation. Descriptions of sensory information registration in biology 
and perceptual psychology do not make any essential appeal to sensory feel.14 
Supposedly, sense perception can be unconscious. Sensory feel is conscious, 
according to the notion of consciousness/experience that I stipulated in the 
beginning of the chapter. Sensory feel ‘has some character that is presented 
for, or to, the subject of the experience,’ and is ‘like something, for the 
experiencing subject.’15 There is nothing more to a sensory feel, than its’ 
subjective character. At present there seems to prevail something like a kind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For example, the explanation of retinal information registration in Wade & Swanston (1991) does 
not mention anything like sensory feel. See p. 4 – 6.  
15 See p. 48 where I expand on experience. 
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of agnosticism in science regarding whether sensory information registration 
and perception has sensory feel. We just do not know whether fish feel pain16, 
or whether bees17, even if they should count as perceivers capable of objective 
representation of physical reality, have any subjective experience. The nature 
of subjective experience is its subjectivity. We can only assume that others 
experience. Hence, agnosticism regarding sensory feel does not, I think, 
suggest that sensation is not subjective experience. I am interested in the 
subjective character of mental representation. Hence, I will not argue that all 
sensory information registration has sensory feel to it. What I will suggest is 
that the way a perceptual representation manifests itself in an individual’s 
psychology is as a subjective experience. (I do not commit to the view that all 
perception is experience. Only that perceptual representation is.)  
 
As I have mentioned, I do not think that subjects need to attend to or be 
able to conceptualize about their experiences. Hence, my view does not 
entail that an individual must be able to entertain any kind of meta-
perspective on her experience in order to have the experience. All that is 
required for something to be an experience is that it has some subjective 
character. My suggestion is that all perceptual representations manifest 
themselves in an individual’s psychology as experienced sensory feels. These 
feels have subjective character. If state has sensory feel it fulfils a sufficient 
condition for being an experience. Again, my suggestion is that any mode of 
presentation must manifest it self in the psychology of an individual in some 
kind of experiential manner, in order to be her perspective. For perceptual 
modes of representation I think such modes are sensory feels. Hence, sensory 
feel constitutes the intrinsic subjectivity of perceptual representations. They 
allow a state to represent to or for an individual. They embody perceptual 
representations. In a sense they are the ‘matter’ that perceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The reason why we do not know this is, partly, that we just do not know what a sensory feel or 
conscious experience is!  
17 Burge argues that we simply do not know whether certain perceivers, such as bees and spiders are 
conscious. (Burge 2010: 375) 
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representational contents are made of. They are something like the symbols 
that carry a perceptual states representational content. They explain how a 
representational content exist in the subject’s psychology as the perspective 
of a subject.  
 
I think non-perceptual representations have subjective character. I remain 
agnostic as to what the subjective character of non-perceptual states such as 
beliefs, thoughts and desires is. I am inclined toward thinking that such states 
have a kind of sensory feel. I think there is good reason to investigate the idea 
that the subjective character of perceptual experience is (similar to) the 
subjective character of conscious belief, thought and desire. On such a view, 
any mental state has a certain bodily character to it. This is closely linked to 
contemporary theories of embodied cognition, however discussion of the idea 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
As mentioned, the strong phenomenal intentionality I have presented in no 
way commits to the idea that there is no unconscious perception, belief, 
thought or desire. It only entails that such unconscious states are non-
representational. At least, they cannot represent in the sense of having 
representational contents, or modes of representation. Modes of 
representation are constitutively perspectival. Perspectives are manifested in 
the psychology of an individual as a state with subjective character, according 
to the view. As mentioned I briefly discuss unconscious mind in 4.6.  
 
The notion of experience that underlies this discussion is perhaps not a very 
strong one. Anything can be an experience, on this view, if it has some 
subjective character. I think it is possible that an individual is not capable of 
expressing the subjective character of her experience. I think it is possible 
that she might not attend to or even notice the subjective character at times. 
For example, an individual might not continuously notice the flavour of her 
gum. This does not, I think, entail that the flavour of her gum cannot be part 
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of her ‘waking life’ or ‘stream of consciousness’ in these cases. I think it only 
entails that she is not always cognitively attended to or in contact with her 
experience. I think that there are cases where her gum still has a flavour to 
her. Subjective character constitutes experience. Subjective character needs 
not be cognitively available. But it is constitutively always like something for 
a subject. Hence, in a sense, the reason why I equate experience and 
representational content is that I have doubts concerning whether 
representational contents can fail to meet the requirements for being an 
experience. A representational perceptual state is a mode of presentation that is 
constitutively sensory. It is a perspective given by sensory information, with 
specific sensory ‘make up’. Perceptual representations are presented by one 
or several sensory modes.  They belong to the individual, as her sensory 
perspective. Can a sensory perspective really fail to be subjective, in the sense 
that it has characteristic subjective feel to an individual? What more is 
required for having subjective character? What gives subjective character, if 
sensory perspectives do not all have it? In a sense, the reason for thinking that 
perspectives are experiences is two-fold. Not only does the perspectival 
feature of a mode of presentation suggest that representations are subjective. 
Reflection on experience seems to suggest that perceptual representational 
states are experiences because they meet the requirements for being such. 
 
In (2010) Burge presents a way of thinking about how perceptual states are 
the perspectives of individuals (Burge 2010:371), that makes no appeal to 
experience. While I sympathize with his general view, I believe it fails to 
capture how perceptual states manifest within an individual’s psychology as 
her perspective. In the following section I expand on this view.  
 
4.5  The Subsystem/Individual Distinction 
As I explain in chapter three, perceptual states are the results of processes 
that have developed in accordance with agency. According to Burge, agency is 
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distinct from things that merely happen within, or to, an individual  (Burge 
2010:327). Action and behaviour lie at the level of individual, not merely at 
the level of internal sub-systems. Digesting is not an action. Ingesting is. 
(Burge 2010:328) As primitive agency has shaped perception, perception 
belongs to the individual. Perceptual states should be attributed to individuals, 
and not merely their perceptual systems, according to Burge (Burge 
2010:374). The relation between agency and perception in part explains the 
representational nature of perceptual states. Perception has developed in 
order to aid individuals so as to facilitate their actions (ingesting food, for 
example). This is why they represent the things they do.18 Perceptual states 
indicate entities that are of relevance for the organism as a whole. They 
represent such entities to the individual. Burge does not appeal to any kind of 
subjectivity in order to explain this. Perceptual representations are not the 
perspectives of individuals in virtue of representing to individuals in 
experience:  
 
More importantly, there is considerable evidence that individuals, not merely subsystems, 
have unconscious perceptual states. So there is reason to doubt that consciousness is 
constitutive either to the individual/subsystem distinction or to perception. (Burge 
2010:374). 
 
Burge provides two reasons why perceptual states are individual level states:  
 
One resides in the connection between perception and whole animal, or individual, function 
— paradigmatically individual agency. (...) perceptual kinds constitutively figure in 
individual functions — in fulfilling needs and guiding actions.’ (2010:370)  
 
A second reason is that:  
 
Being a locus of perceptual representation just is being an individual with a representational 
perspective. The objectification and representational content involved in perception 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I expand on this is chapter three, see 3.7. 
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constitutes a point of view on environmental representata. Representational perspectives or 
points of view are constitutively attributable to individuals. (Burge 2010:371) 
 
The first reason states that perceptual states are states of the individual 
because the processes that determine perceptual states have developed in 
accordance with primitive, pre-perceptual agency. Perception has developed 
so that individuals might successfully fulfil their biological needs for eating, 
navigating and mating (Burge 2010:320).  
 
In itself this does not make the states perspectives of the individual. Some 
agential states are not perspectives. The kind of pre-perceptual, primitive 
agency (2010:320-321, 326-342) Burge describes in order to explain how 
perception has developed in accordance with agential needs and actions, in 
no way relies on any representational state. Eating, navigating and mating are 
examples of agency that does not constitutively depend on perspective.  
 
However, the perceptual system functions to accurately represent for 
individuals. (Burge 2010:308) This gives perceptual states a special role — 
they function to indicate entities that are of relevance to individual creatures. 
Perceptual states are states of the individual because they function to aid 
agency. Perceptual states are representational. Representational states are 
perspectival. Hence, perceptual states are perspectives of individuals.  
 
The second reason Burge describes simply states that perceptual states are 
attributable to individuals because they are perspectives. It addresses how 
perceptual states have the contents they have (are the states they are) because 
they belong to individuals as perspectives on subject matter.  
 
I think both these reasons express truths about the nature of perception and 
mental representation. Perspectives belong to individuals. Perceptual states 
have developed in order to be perspectives. Perspective and individual are 
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interrelated notions. Burge’s account explains why, as in — in virtue of what 
processes — representational states represent to the individual. He gives two 
reasons for thinking that representational states are states of the individual. 
However, he does not explain what it is for a state to be a representational state of 
the individual. His view establishes why perceptual states are the perspectives 
of individuals. However, he does not provide discussion of what a perspective 
is. He does not address the manner in which a perceptual state or any mental 
representation manifests itself in the psychology of an individual.  
 
Burge’s account assumes that the only essential property of a mental 
representation is that it has representational properties and is attributable to 
an individual. Hence, there can be19 unconscious mental representations. I 
think the account appears to overlook the manner in which a mental 
representation exists in the psychology of an individual. Perhaps it 
presupposes that being a representational state is manner enough. I am 
disinclined to think that this is accurate. My suggestion is that perceptual 
representations and representations in general exist as experiences.  
 
With this in mind let me return to the strong phenomenal intentionality I 
put forward. According to this view, all mental representations are intrinsically 
subjective. I suggested that only conscious experiences are intrinsically 
subjective. The strong thesis I put forth simply is the view that all mental 
representations are essentially conscious. Hence, there cannot be any 
unconscious mental representations. An unconscious state cannot be a 
representation, on this view. A consequence of the view is that establishing 
that individuals have representational states entails that those individuals have 
experiences. Claiming that perception is constitutively representational 
simply entails that perception is constitutively conscious, on this view.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 And, according to Burge, there is reason to think that there are, unconscious perceptual 
representations. (Burge 2010:376) 
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I think Burge’s account appears to leave something out in a discussion of 
perspectival states. His explanation simply reveals why individuals have 
perspectival perceptual states, without making use of any notion of 
consciousness or experience. The account is supposed to underlie the idea 
that perspectival states are not necessarily experiences (Burge 2010:376). 
However, the way I interpret the view it simply explains which processes give 
individuals perspectival states. It does not discuss what it is to be a 
perspectival state of an individual. It does not discuss how a mental 
representation can manifest itself in the psychology of an individual. It does 
not attend to what it is to be a mental representation in the psychology of an 
individual.  
 
I think there is an intuitive sense in which perspectives must manifest or 
embody as subjective characters in the psychology of an individual. For 
perceptual states, I think it is plausible that this subjective character is 
sensory feel. Hence, an account that does not discuss the manner in which 
perceptual representations exist in an individual’s psychology is an 
incomplete account. According to Burge, there are scientific reasons for 
thinking that perceptual representation can be unconscious.  
 
4.6  Unconscious Representation in Science 
Burge provides three examples of scientific results that suggest that there can 
be unconscious perceptual representational states. 
 
The first reason is that experiments made on humans with certain dissociative 
disorders, such as blindsight, prosopagnosia and extinction-neglect syndrome, 
have been taken to suggest that there can be visual perception with no 
attached phenomenal experience (Burge 2010:375).  
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Burge also justifies the assumption that there can be unconscious perception 
by arguing that we do not know whether creatures such as spiders and bee’s 
have experience. However these creatures are perceivers. Therefore, as 
perception can be ‘(...) confidently and firmly attributed to bees and spiders 
without knowing whether they are conscious (...)’ (Burge 2010:375) we 
should not presuppose that they are. Bees and spiders might, for all we know, 
be examples of creatures with perceptual capacities that lack phenomenal 
consciousness, according to Burge.  
 
A third example from psychology addresses early stages of vision. These ‘(...) 
may count as perception by the individual (...)’ (Burge 2010:375), in virtue of 
manifesting perceptual constancy. Perceptual constancy is objective 
perceptual representation. However, these early stages of vision are 
supposedly not necessarily conscious experiences.  
 
The first example addresses phenomena that have been given significant 
weight in discussions about perception and consciousness20. However, there 
is not scientific agreement as to the significance of these phenomena21. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this disagreement. I will mention 
that blindsight; prosopagnosia and extinction-neglect syndrome is rare.  
Individuals do not generally have blindsight. There is reason to question how 
much import dissociative disorders should be given in discussions of 
conscious perception.  
 
Burge’s second example does not carry much evidential force in favour of 
unconscious perceptual representation. Why not assume that bee’s and 
spiders have conscious experience? What are the reasons in favour of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Other examples of philosophers who make use of blind sight and other dissociative disorders in 
humans in order to argue that there can be unconscious, representational perception include Jesse 
Prinz ( See ‘When Is Perception Conscious’) and Ned Block (2007)  
21 See Ian Philips’ lecture ’Unconscious Perception Revisited’  
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reluctance? If a conceptual, constitutive relation between experience and 
perspective can be established it entails that any perceiver is conscious.  
 
The third example is, I think, the most convincing one. If early stages of 
vision are representational and unconscious, they simply disprove that 
representational states are constitutively conscious. However, I think 
falsifying the view requires much philosophical analysis of the very nature of 
conscious experience. It is difficult to establish whether a mental state has 
subjective character. After all, subjective character is simply unavailable to 
anyone but the experiencing subject. Hence, increased philosophical 
understanding of the nature of subjective character, perspective, attention, 
access, bodily feel, perception and though is what primarily informs the 
plausibility of the view I have presented.   
 
4.7  Non-Representational Mind?  
The primary problem for the strong phenomenal intentionality thesis is not, I 
think, scientific evidence in favour of an alternative view. Rather, strong 
phenomenal intentionality is faced with having to explain what unconscious 
beliefs; desires; thoughts and perceptual states are, if not representations. I do 
not have a full positive account of what unconscious mentality is. Perhaps 
unconscious attitudes and perceptions are dispositions to believe, or think or 
perceive. Perhaps they are dispositions to behave in a certain manner. 
Perhaps they are representations without any accuracy conditions — perhaps 
they represent only in the sense that they function to correlate with certain 
experiences. Perhaps they are stored information that has been represented in 
experience.  Some kind of eliminitavism about unconscious intentionality has 
to be true, according to the view I present.  
 
I think there are deep connections between subjective character, perspective, 
representation, veridicality and perception. Hence, I think the strong view of 
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phenomenal intentionality that I have presented is at least worth exploring 
further, in relation with science and philosophical progress toward 
understanding what experience is.  
 
	   	  
	  
65 
Appendix :  Ideologica l  Consequences  
of  the  View that  Percept ion i s  
Representat iona l    
There are certain consequences of ideological kind that follow from 
representationalism about perception. It provides some explanatory 
ground for how minds come to be intentional at all — namely that 
perceptual processes grant intentional states that provide the 
background for other intentionality. An important virtue of the view 
that perception is the beginning of mental representation is that it 
recognizes the similarities between the mental capacities of humans and 
other animals. The view Burge advocates, suggests that non-human 
individuals, as well as infants and adults who lack certain higher 
cognitive skills, still perceive their environments in ways that are 
relevantly similar to human adults who possess such abilities. Several 
CIR-views have, I think, expressed a speciesist tendency to overestimate 
the significance of capacities such as language and conceptual thought. 
These capacities are arguably significant in human self-reflection, and 
they have been extensively used to separate us from the others — People 
of other ethnicities, women, humans with cognitive disabilities, children, 
other animals and nature in general. The same point can be made for 
many theories that have amplified the significance of conscious 
experience for perception.  
 
Philosophers and psychologists have stressed that human mental 
capacities are unique — they are of a different kind to other 
phenomenon. This line of thought has combined with the tendency to 
think that only adult, white males are properly human. Women, non-
white people, children, people with cognitive disabilities and non-
human animals have been mistreated as a consequence of such ideas.  
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Granting that mind begins in perception and that non-mammalian 
creatures, perhaps even certain arachnids, have perceptual capacities is a 
good vantage point for unravelling and understanding how human 
cognition is not radically different from other species’ capacities. 
Perhaps mankind entertain species-specific mental abilities. There is, 
however, no evidence that these abilities must be of a different kind to 
the abilities of other species. My ambition in chapter 4 of this thesis has 
not been to suggest that arachnids, or other non-mammalian creatures 
that we do not certainly known to have experience, do not have 
intentional minds. If there is any evidence that they do, I believe we 
have normative reasons for assuming it. Rather, my suggestion would be 
that there are significant reasons to suppose that intentional mind is 
experiential. If this is the case, then, provided that the creatures I 
mention above have intentional perceptual capacities, they have 
experiences. An important moral is that perception, whatever it is, is a 
primitive ability, shared across species, and that this capacity serves as 
the foundation for much of our mentality in general. As mentioned, this 
mentality has been used as an excuse to treat those assumed to lack it, in 
ways inferior. The philosophy of mind should counteract such practice.  
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